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Abstract This article analyses the material of a European Project on Responsible Research
and Innovation in Neuroenhancement (NERRI) to explore how the brain is
articulated in this ﬁeld. Since brains are closely connected to ideas of self,
responsibility, free will and being human, and since brain metaphors have
important effects on research practices and perspectives, it also matters how people
talk about and use the brain. In the NERRI project, the brain is articulated as an
agent interacting with or substituting the self; as a system that can, cannot or
should not be analysed; and as the part of oneself that can potentially change
human nature in positive and negative ways. Since most of the material analysed
was produced by neuroscientists or other neuroenhancement experts, this article
emphasises the responsibility of the experts in this process. By showing what brain
images are disseminated within the ﬁeld of neuroenhancement, and analysing how
this depiction is related to ideas of self or being human, this article does not only
intend to contribute to a more empirically based and societally relevant
neuroenhancement debate, but also to a more realistic and societally relevant idea
of the brain.
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Introduction
Some years ago, I worked as a researcher for two different neuro-projects simultaneously. In
the ﬁrst half of the week, I analysed transcripts and reports of interviews and debates on the
topic of neuroenhancement (the idea that we can use the brain to enhance people’s perfor-
mances), and in the second half of the week, I interviewed neuromarketers and visited confer-
ences on neuromarketing (the idea that we can use the brain to make people buy things). Soon
I noticed that both neuro-ﬁelds actually talked about a very different kind of brain. Among
neuromarketers and their public the brain was basically articulated as an entity that could be
manipulated because of its static, and (evolutionary) determined character (e.g. Morin 2011),
while the researchers in the ﬁeld of neuroenhancement mainly accentuated the plasticity and
(future) possibilities of the brain, and referred to people’s own responsibility in this process.
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That is, neuromarketers and neuroenhancement experts appeared to articulate not only different
kinds of brains, but also different ways of being human.
Since I was involved in the neuroenhancement project as one of the ‘responsible’ research-
ers while I was only an observer in the ﬁeld of neuromarketing,1 I decided to analyse the
material of this European Project on Responsible Research and Innovation in neuroenhance-
ment (NERRI) to ﬁnd out how the brain is articulated in this ﬁeld.2 Studying the depiction of
the neuro-enhanceable brain gives information on the meaning of the brain in the ﬁeld of neu-
roenhancement, and it also provides information on what the term enhancement does with the
idea of the brain. The purpose of this is not only to provide insights in how the brain is evolv-
ing in our brain focused society, and how this is related to our ideas of being oneself and
being human, but also to reﬂect on the role of academics in this process.
That scientists do not only study phenomena but also (or rather) constitute these, is a famil-
iar insight among sociologists, science and technology scholars and philosophers (e.g. Latour
and Woolgar 1979). In addition, that social scientists also create phenomena with their social
studies, such as kinds of people (Hacking 2006), social phenomena (Osborne and Rose 1999)
or subjectivities (Pickersgill et al. 2011) is also frequently discussed. Hence, this article sees
the social scientists, neuroscientists, philosophers, etc., collaborating in the NERRI project not
as neutral actors providing objective knowledge about an urgent problem, but as ‘agents of
subjectiﬁcation’ (Pickersgill et al. 2011: 362) because they make the public more aware of
their brain and the (potential) possibilities to intervene in this brain.
Humans, enhancement and the brain
Neuroenhancement is the ﬁeld around the idea that we can use technologies3 or pharmaceuti-
cals to enhance our brains, and with this our cognitive or other performances. It is a new
(brain) focus in a much older discussion on bioenhancement or human enhancement. So far,
these enhancement discussions were mainly hold by bioethicists and philosophers (Pickersgill
and Hogle 2015). The topic evolved in the 1990s and has resulted in numerous publications
and debates. Many of these, however, seem to repeat the same issues over and over again
(Brenninkmeijer and Zwart 2016). The so-called bioconservatives argue that enhancement
technologies will dehumanise people. They will make people less authentic, and society more
competitive and unequal (Fukuyama 2002, Kass 2007). On the other hand, Post- or transhu-
manists claim that people should be free to decide for themselves if they want to use enhan-
cers, and that this should not be seen as a degradation, but rather as an upgrade of human
nature (Bostrom 2005, Harris 2010). Moreover, many of the arguments in the enhancement
debates are mainly theoretical or futuristic (what if), or they discuss the relevance of the debate
(does it work/do people really use it) (Hall and Lucke 2010, Quednow 2010).
As a result, some scholars argue that the debate should be refocused to a more realistic and
societally relevant stage, and for example, analyse the ideas of the public regarding speciﬁc
neuroenhancement cases (Brenninkmeijer and Zwart 2016, Coveney 2011). This approach
seems to meet the empirical research agenda on enhancement as proposed by Pickersgill and
Hogle (2015) in which they suggest that the medical humanities and social sciences should
contribute to the social discourse around enhancement – for example, by attending to issues
that are not commonly discussed yet, or by studying actual practices. Moreover, one of their
suggestions is to study what ‘ideas about society, of the body, and of individual hopes and
fears are imagined and/or channelled within processes of innovation’ (p. 137). This article
analyses the ideas of the brain that are channelled within the (dissemination) processes of
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neuroenhancement, and with this reﬂection, I hope to contribute to a more societally relevant
and empirically based neuroenhancement debate.
Moreover, my analysis also contributes to the (sociological) discussions on the impact of
neuroscience on human beings. According to many scholars, ideas of the brain are related to
ideas of self, personhood or subjectivity. In neuroscience and neurophilosophy, the brain is
often presented as the seat of the self and the (supposed) causal functioning of our neuronal
system implies that concepts such as free will or responsibility are empty concepts (Church-
land 2013, Damasio 2012). Also in other disciplines, such as psychiatry or law, human beha-
viour is increasingly explained with the help of neuroscience. As a result of such
developments, the sociologist Nikolas Rose, argued some years ago that we have become neu-
rochemical selves, because personhood is no longer concerned with the mind or the psyche,
but with the brain (Rose 2007).4 This new knowledge makes that we take ourselves to be dif-
ferent kinds of persons, and can be understood as a shift in human ontology: ‘It entails a new
way of seeing, judging, and acting upon human normality and abnormality. It enables us to be
governed in new ways. And it enables us to govern ourselves differently’. (Rose 2007: 192).
Other scholars described a comparable impact of brain knowledge on the self. The anthropolo-
gist of science Joseph Dumit, for example, studied how brain images can alter people’s under-
standing of their own body (Dumit 2004). Fernando Vidal performed a historical study on
‘brainhood’, with which he referred to the ‘quality of being a brain’ (Vidal 2009). Davi John-
son Thornton analysed how the message that ‘you are your brain’ enables the idea of biologi-
cal self-constitution (Thornton 2011). Several other scholars used ethnographic research or
media analysis to argue that people who are confronted with their neurological constitution do
not simply become neurological subjects but use a heterogeneous language of psychological
and physiological statements (Br€oer and Heerings 2013, Choudhury et al. 2012, O’Connor
and Joffe 2013, Pickersgill et al. 2011, Singh 2013). Additionally, Rose and Abi-Rached
(2013) extensively describe this development of ‘personhood in a neurobiological age’, and
they conclude that personhood has not become brainhood, but that the idea of neuroplasticity
requires that people take care of their brains (see also Brenninkmeijer 2010).
That is to say, the impact of brain knowledge on ideas of being human is discussed in many
forms. The idea that people are their brains, and that the brain is a causal machine, seems to
imply that concepts such as self, free will or responsibility have to be reconsidered. The idea
that the brain is plastic and changeable, on the other hand, is often discussed in a neoliberal
context in which brain plasticity becomes a(n) (individual) responsibility (Broer and Pickersgill
2015, Malabou 2009, Pitts-Taylor 2010, Rose and Abi-Rached 2013). Other empirical studies
especially relativise the importance of the brain, or show its impact on subjectivity.
Hence, it was interesting to ﬁnd that these different characteristics of the brain as related to
the self also emerged when studying what ideas of the brain were channelled in the ﬁeld of
neuroenhancement. Moreover, related to the ideas of the brain and its inﬂuence on the self,
was the theme of the brain as a system: too complex to understand according to some, analy-
sable according to others, and something not to disturb according to again others. That is, this
metaphor of a system seems to surpass the well-known metaphor of the brain as a computer
since it is more ﬂexible and less explicative. As Borck (2012) convincingly describes in his
chapter on models and metaphors in brain research, brain metaphors are signiﬁcant because
they shape research perspectives and the accompanying neurocultures (see also Williams et al.
2012). The combination of these themes resulted in a third theme which was phrased as the
natural and artiﬁcial brain. This theme about the impact of brain optimisation on human nature
and human evolution appeared to be an inheritance of philosophical debates on bioconser-
vatism and transhumanism (e.g. Bostrom 2005).
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That is, this article analyses what kind of brain discourse is articulated in an extensive Euro-
pean project on neuroenhancement. Herewith, it aims to contribute to (sociological) discus-
sions on the impact of neuroscience on human beings (e.g. Rose and Abi-Rached 2013). Since
brains are closely connected to ideas of self, responsibility, free will and being human (e.g.
Churchland 2013), and since metaphors have important effects on research practices and per-
spectives (Borck 2012), it also matters how people talk about and use the brain. Moreover,
since most of the quotes analysed for this article were produced by neuroscientists or other
neuroenhancement experts, this article emphasises the responsibility of the academics in this
process. By showing what brain metaphors and promises are disseminated in the neuroen-
hancement debate this article does not only intend to contribute to a more societally relevant
and empirically based neuroenhancement debate (Brenninkmeijer and Zwart 2016, Pickersgill
and Hogle 2015), but also to a more realistic and societally relevant idea of the brain.
Material and methods
The NERRI projected ran from 2013 to 2016 and was funded by the European Commission.
According to the Description of Work, NERRI:
aims to contribute to the introduction of Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) in
Neuroenhancement (NE) in the European Research Area and to the shaping of a normative
framework underpinning the governance of NE technologies. These will be achieved
through mobilization and mutual learning (MML) activities engaging scientists, policy-
makers, industry, civil society groups, patients and the wider public. (NERRI 2013)
The project was executed by a consortium of 18 partner institutions (research, science commu-
nication and patient advocacy institutions) from 11 European countries.5 Each country col-
lected relevant national literature on neuroenhancement and conducted semi-structured
interviews with stakeholders about their opinions on neuroenhancement. These stakeholders
could be researchers or producers of neuro-technologies, policymakers or ethicists, or (poten-
tial) users of neuroenhancement technologies such as patients or students. Summaries of these
– over 120 – interviews were collected and analysed and subsumed in a report (NR-I).6
To stimulate ‘Societal Dialogue’, each partner institution organised several mobilisation and
mutual learning exercises (MLE’s). An MLE ‘aims to bring together various groups of stake-
holders (researchers, users, intermediaries, professionals, students, media, broader publics) to
facilitate a mutual learning process through mutual exposure of views and experiences, expec-
tations and concerns’ (NERRI 2015). These MLE’s were seen as the core of the project and
they varied extensively in size (from 7 to 130 participants, and some larger – up to 1200 peo-
ple – events), duration (mostly less than 1 day, but sometimes a couple of days or even
weeks), form (focus groups, science cafe’s, debates, student courses, workshops, symposia,
think tanks), means (expert lectures, card games, theatre, cinema) and spoken languages. Eng-
lish reports of these – 64 in total – events were presented in the form of newsletter articles on
the website, and analyses and summaries were collected with an online form.
The international and interactive character and the extensiveness of the project make NERRI
an interesting and relevant case to study the ﬁeld of neuroenhancement. I used the written
material available in Dutch and English to analyse how the word brain is used in the NERRI
reports. This material included the summaries of the interviews, the summaries of the MLE’s,
the newsletter articles, some notes of NERRI meetings, and the Dutch interviews and
© 2018 The Author. Sociology of Health & Illness published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Foundation for SHIL.
The brain as an agentic system 115
transcripts of the MLE’s (see Appendix). The material I used (summaries, newsletters, tran-
scripts) was not produced by, nor on authority of, me, since my role was limited to the analy-
sis of the MLE’s and other material produced in the project. I was part of NERRI for the
Radboud University of Nijmegen (Netherlands), which was responsible for the organisation
and analysis of the MLE’s. I attended most of the Dutch MLE’s, and I had access to the tran-
scripts/recordings of the Dutch MLE’s and interviews. I also had a role in the production of a
progress and ﬁnal report on the results of the MLE’s (NERRI 2014, 2015).
To analyse this diverse material – consisting of summaries, news reports and full transcripts
of interviews or public events – I used a thematic content analysis (e.g. Green and Thorogood
2014). I collected all sentences with the word ‘brain’, added some sentences that were indi-
rectly related to the brain (e.g. by referring to its chemicals or processes), and excluded those
phrases that were less meaningful – for example, because the word ‘brain’ was used in a refer-
ence, or as part of a technology (deep brain stimulation). Next, I listed all unique brain phrases
and after reading and coding (and rereading and recoding), these could be categorised in three
themes. To give an indication of the numbers: I collected about 1000 brain quotes (350 pages)
which resulted in about 150 unique and relevant quotes. These were divided into three cate-
gories of about 40–50 quotes per category, and some remaining quotes. Many quotes
expressed the relation between the person (mind, self, sometimes body) and the brain. Other
quotes concerned the ‘knowability’ of the brain. A third category of quotes concerned the
impact of brain enhancement on human nature.7
These themes were recognised inductively and the interviews, events, etc. were also not
organised to ﬁnd information regarding the brain. Moreover, the diversity of the material
makes it assumable that not all themes are equally spread among the material. It is possible,
for example, that a summary might contain less metaphors, or sentences on person-brain rela-
tions, than a newsfeed, or a transcript. Perhaps a public event evokes more popular metaphors
than a personal interview – for example, because they both aim at a different audience. It is
also conceivable that in some countries or events the topic human nature is more discussed
than in others, or that some people (e.g. neuroscientists) make more brain-related remarks than
others (e.g. philosophers). However, due to the enormous amount of material, and also the
overlap (MLE’s were summarised, sometimes transcribed and sometimes discussed in news-
feeds), it was not analysed which themes occurred more in which sort of material, event etc.
The NERRI project intended to stimulate a mutual debate among (potential) users, produc-
ers, intermediaries and the general public about the topic of neuroenhancement (NERRI 2013).
However, the material produced under the name of NERRI mainly derived from NERRI part-
ners (e.g. writing newsletters or reports), and also the transcripts of the interviews and events
mainly gave a voice to people who were somehow familiar with the ﬁeld of neuroenhance-
ment. That is, the NERRI quotes are not general in the sense that they could have been
expressed by anyone, but the wide range of countries, events and actors involved, combined
with the aim of the project to evoke mutual learning events and to disseminate this knowledge
among the general public, indicates that these quotes are at least released within a wide public.
Brains and selves
One of the themes that was identiﬁed by reading through the quotes collected, concerned the
brain as being (part of) the mind or self. Analysing these quotes gave insight in to how the
NERRI people (and perhaps other people too) express the relation between the brain, the body
and the mind or self. In contrast to traditional philosophical debates about dualistic and monis-
tic existences, these quotes revealed a different sort of brain idiom. Instead of meandering
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between being a brain (monism) or having a brain (dualism), many people seem to have
obtained a position transcending these categories.
Many experts (NERRI partners, or experts invited for an interview) emphasised the situation
that we are more than our brains. Phrases like: ‘the whole person, not just [on] the brain,
mood or body’ (MLER), ‘It is about something much broader than brains’ (I-1), ‘it is about
our brain, not our body’ (NM), ‘our brains and bodies’ (NR-R) or ‘Not just the body but the
mind’ (NN) make clear that according to many people there is more than just the brain. In
these quotations, a difference emerges not only between mind and body (as we were used to),
but between minds (or moods), bodies and brains. That is, following the meaning of these
quotes, people have brains and bodies and minds. Even in antidualistic explanations this dis-
tinction between body and brain comes to the fore. One of the Dutch interviewees, a neurosci-
entist, for example says: ‘We are not dualists anymore – the idea that our body is something
different than who we are. Body and mind are not separate. Both bodily changes and neuro-
logical changes change yourself’ (I-2). This referring to both bodily and neurological processes
still reveals a dichotomy.
Such expressions about people having brains, bodies and minds support a neo-Cartesian
argument, as, for example, explained by Hacking (2007). According to Hacking, neuroscien-
tists simply added a brain to a dualistic idiom, by which they made a triad of mind, body and
brain. This mind-body-brain creature is not unique for neuroenhancement experts, but mani-
fests itself also in other brain texts and expressions (Brenninkmeijer 2016). Although this
image perhaps evokes a somewhat restricted understanding of human beings – since people
often make use of many more entities that cannot simply be deﬁned to a mind-body-brain
idiom (Brenninkmeijer 2016) – it can be recognised in the NERRI brain quotes.
Moreover, NERRI people do not only express humans as persons with brains, bodies and
minds: they also show that there can be interaction among these entities. This interaction
occurs in two ways. The most common variant is a caring relationship with the brain, and this
especially becomes manifest when people discuss brain enhancement technologies such as neu-
rofeedback or transcranial Direct Current Stimulation. To explain such brain technologies,
experts and other people involved in a World Cafe8 talk about the possibilities to, for example,
‘train’ their brain, ‘fool’ their brain, ‘slow down’ their brain or ‘decide for’ their brain
(MLE38). Also with regard to ‘more natural’ experienced methods like coffee, sleep, r healthy
eating, participants wonder if these cannot help them to ‘achieve these “right” dopamine
levels’, according to one of the NERRI partners (MLER).
This caring for the brain is not simply a one-way action. The brain is also expected to return
the favour – for example, in the form of more creativity, intelligence or concentration. Still, it
could be argued that this mind-body-brain idiom is not much more elucidating than monistic
statements that ‘we are our brain’ or dualistic statements that our material body produces an
immaterial spirit. ‘If we take care of our brain, our brain increases our performance’ sounds as
simple as ‘If we drink much water, our kidneys will produce more urine’. However, while kid-
neys are relatively predictable servants, brains appear to be more agentic actors (or actants).
Agentic brains represent another subcategory that can clearly be identiﬁed in the NERRI
expressions. This acting is often formulated with phrases like: ‘people with . . .. brains’. Exam-
ples given by NERRI partners or experts involved in NERRI debates are: ‘A person with a
“criminal” brain’ (W, MLE3), ‘People with dopamine deﬁciency’ (MLE1) or ‘People with less
beta-activity [are more vulnerable to complaints of burn-out]’ (MLE38). Expressions from
experts with a comparable meaning are among others: ‘it [only] works for some people who
are below a certain level of neurotransmitters’ (I-3), or ‘everything we observe, experience,
process, keep, think about, say, sing, our motor system: everything is in principle steered by
the brain’. (I-4)
© 2018 The Author. Sociology of Health & Illness published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Foundation for SHIL.
The brain as an agentic system 117
In some cases, this agentic brain can take over human actions or even exclude the self at
all. Neuroscientists and other neuro-experts (practitioner; student) used phrases like: ‘In the
case of acute stress, the brain takes the prefrontal cortex ofﬂine’ (MLE1), ‘Dopamine (. . .)
makes sure you can do better’ (I-2), ‘What brains can do with us’ (MLE38), ‘the brain is
smart, it can recover’ (MLE39) or ‘Our brain, just like other systems, is something that strives
for homeostasis. Self-preservation’ (MLE1). This indicates that brains can be dominant actors,
overruling the need of a person or self at all.
Moreover, in some phrases, brains even acquire human qualities, or start to interact with the
owner of the brain. One producer of neuroenhancement technologies says, for example, in an
interview: ‘all our little neurons are correlation seekers’(I-5) and ‘there will be neurons that
recognise this very fast’(I-5). In a news report on the NERRI website, a neuroscientist talks
about an ‘Immoral molecule’ (NN). Such phrases attribute human capacities directly to the
brain. Other neuroenhancement experts made phrases like: ‘when the brain doesn’t like it
(. . .), it can give you a headache’ (MLE38) or ‘It changes the working of your brain so much
(that) it affects how you lead your life’ (I-1). This reveals an interaction between a human
actor (you) and a human brain.
This interaction between the self (you) and the brain can be so prominent that actually
two autonomous actors emerge – both performing not only in a caring but also in a compet-
itive relationship. This becomes salient in this quote of a neurofeedback therapist involved
in one of the workshops: ‘If someone has something with his brain, but works very hard,
perhaps he compensates and you don’t notice anything. While someone with an optimal
brain, who cuts corners, might be less efﬁcient’ (MLE38). That is, in this quotation it is
impossible to maintain a monistic argument since the brain and the self can compensate
each other’s actions.
The idea of neuroenhancement clearly emphasises the notion of brain plasticity (we can
improve our brains), but this view is regularly combined with more deterministic understand-
ings (we are our brains). Apparently, the self and the brain can be separate and the same. The
brain is not a static actor, but is extremely ﬂexible and active: it can be you or producing you,
is both subject and object, ﬁgures as master or servant, has human qualities or disrupts these,
produces free will or eliminates it. Moreover, instead of being a brain or having a brain, peo-
ple seem to develop an agentic brain capable of interacting with or substituting the self.
Brain systems and metaphors
Above, I gave an account of the interactions between the brain and the self, as they appeared
in my analysis of the NERRI quotations. However, being, having or interacting with the brain
does not provide much information yet about people’s conceptions or understandings of the
brain. In this section, I analyse those brain quotations that referred to the (desired or expected)
‘knowability’ of the brain.
Comparing all brain-related quotations from the NERRI project, a general picture of the
brain as a system emerged. Although a system is perhaps not considered as a clear meta-
phor, this image is most likely inﬂuenced by the well-known metaphor of the brain as a
computer (Borck 2012, Rodriguez 2006) and probably also by biological, evolutionary or
cybernetic vocabularies that portray the brain as a physiological, adaptive system (Borck
2012, Pickering 2010). Thinking about the brain as a system suggests that we see the brain
as a mechanism; as something with input and output. A system is related to the idea of con-
trol – although it is not always speciﬁed how this control takes place. It is about action and
© 2018 The Author. Sociology of Health & Illness published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Foundation for SHIL.
118 Jonna Brenninkmeijer
reaction. Since a system is composed of structures and components, in theory we can anal-
yse or understand the system.
In the NERRI reports, this idea of the brain as an analysable system emerges in quotations
of NERRI partners and neuroscientists:
‘the processes in the brain would be modelled with high speed computing systems, and sub-
sequently a decoding of the functions of the brain would be possible’ (NN)
‘the brain is a highly complex non-linear system’ (NN)
‘Our brains are like a jig-saw consisting of many small fragments that work with each other’
(NN)
‘Our brain, just like other systems, is something that strives for homeostasis’ (MLE1)
‘the mechanisms by which the working of the brain gives rise to the mind’ (MLE12)
‘the brain takes the prefrontal cortex ofﬂine’ (MLE1)
‘the technical aspects of the (. . .) working of the brain’ (MLER)
In these explanations, terms like processes, modelling, decoding, nonlinear, jigsaw, fragments
or mechanisms reveal a technical interpretation of the brain. The brain is understood as an
entity that can be known and probably modiﬁed. However, this image of a knowable brain
also frightens people, and sometimes goes along with ideas of brain technologies as a sort of
lie detectors. One participant of an MLE, for example, fantasises about job applications with
EEG: ‘when you have too many high voltages, we don’t give you the job because you are sus-
ceptible for getting a burn-out’ (MLE38). A philosopher attending the same workshop sug-
gests: ‘I think your brain structure will be different when you read a lot, or when you play a
lot of games or use tablets. I assume. You might be able to see this at the dendrites of the
brain’ (MLE38).
The idea of the brain as an analysable system brings along two possible future scenarios:
if we understand the brain we might be able to improve the person, but we might also be
able to know or control the person. This interrelation of the brain and the person is typical
for this speciﬁc organ, and radically differs from any other organ in our body. We are
happy to know the working of the kidneys, the heart, the lungs, etc., but understanding the
mechanisms of the brain also frightens. As a result, two other tendencies regarding the brain
as a system can be observed: the brain is often presented as an unanalysable system, a black
box. Furthermore, the brain is sometimes described as a holy system: a sanctum we should
leave untouched.
The image of the brain as an unanalysable system is expressed by emphasising the ‘com-
plexity’ of the brain, for example, by arguing that even the ‘most prominent researchers are
highly sceptical about the prospects of enhancing the healthy human brain’, or that we ‘hardly
know what is inside the brain’ (NERRI partner in MLE12). Moreover, professional users and
producers of brain technologies who have high hopes of future possibilities for neuroenhance-
ment also often put their ideas into perspective with remarks like: ‘we are still over 100 years
away from being able to record from all the neurons in the cortex’ (NN), or ‘The language of
the brain is not known yet’ (I-4).
Sometimes expressed as a result of this complexity, other times as a result of its close rela-
tion with personhood, the brain is also seen as an object we should be very careful with. In
the NERRI report that summarises the interviews, one of the partners refers to ideas of the
brain as a ‘special or almost “holy” organ, and not something to be messed with’ (NR-I). One
philosopher and participant of a Dutch workshop calls this ‘brain exceptionalism’: ‘if it is
about the brain, we have to be very careful, and take more precautions’ (MLE38). This idea
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can be retrieved in several expressions of other people attending this World Cafe9 that mainly
involved neuroenhancement experts (students, researchers and practitioners). For example, one
participant suggests: ‘In the brain . . . I have the feeling that it is deeper. It is more irreparable
or more disastrous if it goes wrong’ (MLE38). Someone else clariﬁes: ‘The brain is something
special. (. . .) There is something with identity. It is so much more exciting than a stomach,
intestine, or liver. Precisely because it is so important, you make exceptions for it’ (MLE38).
This exceptionalism is also phrased in sentences like: ‘But in this case we are really talking
about the brain’(MLE38), ‘The brain is (. . .) very vulnerable and a sensitive organ’ (MLE38),
‘we should be very careful with the brain’ (MLE38) or ‘Do you think we should create a sanc-
tum for the brain?’ (MLE38).
These portrayals of the brain as an analysable system, a black box, or a sanctum are some-
times also reﬂected in the metaphors people use to describe the brain or its actions. Some neu-
roscientists, for example, used phrases like ‘pump external signals in the brain’ (I-5),
‘Dopamine stokes a ﬁre (in the reptilian brain)’ (MLE1), ‘the brain takes the prefrontal cortex
ofﬂine’ (MLE1), ‘warm up (. . .) the parietal cortex’ (I-5). Such expressions derive from meta-
phors of the brain as an engine, computer or other machinery, and this represents a technical
and hence knowable brain that can be tinkered with. A brain that can be ‘impoverished’
(MLE38), ‘diseased’ (NR-B) or ‘affected’ (NN), or should be ‘protected’ (NN) or ‘repaired’
(NN) on the other hand, indicates a source that should be taken care of since it otherwise
could break down or become ill. What is more, these images and metaphors appear to be
related to a philosophical discussion about the human as a natural or artiﬁcial being. The tech-
nical brain seems to represent the artiﬁcial human – always seeking for an upgrade, while the
brain as a black box or a sanctum represents a respect for the human brain as a balanced and
natural entity – something not to disturb.
Natural and artiﬁcial brain
The distinction between a technical or artiﬁcial brain (a brain that is considered as having
potential beyond normality) and a natural brain (a brain that should not be disturbed because it
needs a natural balance to produce authentic human capacities) actually intermingles three
philosophical or ethical issues. One on human authenticity that discusses if using artiﬁcial
technologies can evoke authentic emotions (e.g. Bolt 2007, Kraemer 2011), one on human nat-
ure that questions if neuroenhancement is part of a natural process or something that exceeds
humanity and makes us ‘post’-humans (Bostrom and Sandberg 2009, Clark 2003) and one on
human evolution that questions if we should protect human beings from becoming post- or
transhuman (e.g. Fukuyama 2002, Kass 2007) or that we should stimulate this transition (Bos-
trom 2005, Harris 2010).
In the NERRI project, the discussion about the brain as a natural or artiﬁcial object is often
formulated as a debate about neuroenhancement being part of, or as surpassing, humanity or
human evolution. In more implicit terms, this discussion focuses on neuroenhancement as
belonging to the normal human being (as functioning within the limits of normal human beha-
viour; as a normal thing to do), or as something that will exceed normality. Classifying
NERRI quotes regarding this natural/artiﬁcial theme, however, does not show a clear division
in being pro or contra neuroenhancement. The argument that neuroenhancement is a normal or
natural human habit is often used as an argument to speak in favour of neuroenhancement, but
it can also exemplify a warning that we should not exaggerate the possibilities of enhancement
and be alert to the safety problems. The argument that we can become super-humans, on the
other hand, is often (but not always) expressed to unfold a dystopian scenario.
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Quotes from NERRI news reports referring to neuroenhancement as a typically human thing to
do or as belonging to a normal evolutionary process are often variations of the argument:
‘Humanity has been always searching for means to enhance further brain performance’. (NN) or
‘Enhancing the human brain is as old as humanity itself’ (NN). Other quotations emphasise the
unicity of human qualities: ‘The ability to improve ourselves is unique for human beings’ (Neuro-
scientist in MLE1) or make a strong connection between enhancement and civilisation: ‘Human
civilization is basically a series of experiments in enhancement’ (NN). Moreover, in some expres-
sions, neuroenhancement as part of this evolutionary process is also questioned. Phrases from
NERRI news reports illustrate this uncertainty: ‘Will we need it [neuroenhancement] for the sur-
vival of our species?’ (NN), ‘Aren’t humans always “artiﬁcial”?’ (NN), ‘can we make signiﬁcant
changes to what nature gave us and still call ourselves humans?’ (NN). Also, students who follow
a neuroenhancement course related to MLE1 wonder in an essay: ‘How authentic can grand-
mother be if her Alzheimer’s is cured, but half of her brain is artiﬁcial?’(MLE1a).
The majority of quotes in this direction, however, represent an opposite position. In most
occasions, neuroenhancement is not considered as a normal human process but as something
surpassing humanity or human evolution. The NERRI website, for example, makes claims
like: ‘We are entering a new chapter in the human history, we can become transhumans’ (NN)
or ‘a normal human is just not able to see like this’ (NN). This represents a point of view
which is occasionally brought up as very positive. Neuroenhancement, for example, ‘may
allow’ humans to perceive ‘beyond the scope of our biological organs’ (NN), and makes per-
sons ‘able to realize achievements’ (MLE1a) or ‘complement’ (NERRI partner in MLE12)
their biological brains. The artiﬁciality argument is sometimes also formulated as a question,
(‘do we want a super brain?’ [MLER]) – but it is most often related to concerns and objections
towards neuroenhancement. Fears that people can become ‘outdated’, dangerous scenarios
about ‘brains with electronic components’, ‘hyperintelligent super-brains’ or ‘the robotization
of humans’, represent such dystopian science ﬁction scenarios as phrased by NERRI partners
(W, MLER). On the other hand, fears about changing ‘the natural cycle of life’, the ‘natural
balanced state of the human brain’, the ‘natural balance’ or the ‘natural human evolution’
(MLER) – actually make the same argument as the dystopian science ﬁction scenarios, but
emphasises an opposite characteristic of the brain (i.e. natural instead of artiﬁcial).
The distinction between natural and artiﬁcial brains does not follow a clear line between pro-
ponents and opponents of neuroenhancement. In contrast to what might be expected from philo-
sophical discussions on authenticity, human nature or human evolution, the distinction between
the human (or brain) as a natural being that should be authentic and not something to (artiﬁ-
cially) tinker with, or the brain as the point of access to a new evolutionary process; a plea for
transhumanism – is not very clear. The idea that neuroenhancement is a normal process in
human evolution is often used as a pro-enhancement argument, while the idea that neuroen-
hancement surpasses normality or human evolution merely evokes negative associations towards
neuroenhancement. However, what is quite speciﬁc for this theme of natural and artiﬁcial brains
is that the idea of brain optimisation seems to be related to our understanding of being human.
Improving brain capacities is considered as elevating us above a ‘natural’, ‘normal’ human level.
The brain is seen as the part of ourselves that grants us our humanity and hence, tinkering with
the brain is also seen as tinkering with humanity or human evolution.
Worrying about the brain
In the NERRI project, the brain is articulated as an agent interacting with or substituting the
self. It is seen as a system that can, cannot or should not be analysed. In addition, the idea of
© 2018 The Author. Sociology of Health & Illness published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Foundation for SHIL.
The brain as an agentic system 121
neuroenhancement turns the brain into an object that can potentially change human nature in
positive and negative ways. However, this analysis leads to some further questions. One might
wonder, for example, how general these tendencies of the brain are, and what these conclu-
sions actually entail.
Most of the quotes used in this article stem from people who can be seen as neuroenhance-
ment experts. Many of them are from NERRI-partners; writing newsletters for the website,
giving summaries of MLE’s, or participating in their own debates. Others are from neuroscien-
tists, being interviewed, giving lectures, or participating in focus groups. Furthermore, quotes
are from students following a course on neuroenhancement, or from producers, practitioners or
users of neuroenhancement technologies. Taking together all these quotes from all these
experts ﬁguring in many different events, situations and texts, gives a rough exposition of
brain related expressions that generally do not represent the current state of affairs in neuro-
science or philosophy. On the contrary, this article makes clear that scientiﬁc or philosophical
categories or dichotomies do not always persist when they are released in the general public.
Classic monistic and dualistic idioms are intermingled, the brain is explained with fantastic
metaphors, and ethical arguments on authenticity and artiﬁciality do not always follow the
expected lines. As a result, such brain expressions could easily be interpreted as small jokes or
imprecisions, as slips of the tongue without any implication. However, I would like to argue
that these explanations, metaphors and concerns are signiﬁcant, and perhaps especially because
they derive from the voices of neuroenhancement experts. As indicated among others by
Osborne and Rose (1999), (social) scientists can also create phenomena, and although neuroen-
hancement experts will have no intention to disseminate an agentic version of the brain, their
‘neuroenhancement gaze’ might help constituting a speciﬁc way of thinking about the brain
(Pickersgill et al. 2011).10
New knowledge, metaphors or ideas about the brain do not change the brain as a substance.
They might, however, change the role the brain performs in our lives and society. The brain
as an agentic system capable of threatening or saving human nature is something completely
different than the brain as a computer or as a static (or declining) organ. These different por-
trayals of the brain interact with different actors (ethicists, neuroscientists instead of, for exam-
ple, clinical neurologists), might inﬂuence policy (the aim of NERRI), evokes new knowledge
(e.g. on free will and responsibility) and emotions (e.g. fears and hopes). That is, although the
brain as an agentic system that makes us human has the same biochemical constitution as the
brain we study for medical reasons or biological knowledge it clearly interferes with other
actors, policies, knowledge, emotions, responsibilities, etc. Not only the ‘idea’ of the brain dif-
fers in these contexts: but what the brain is and what the brain does (See e.g. Mol and Law
2004). Hence, the aim of the NERRI project to create awareness and responsibility regarding
neuroenhancement technologies through engaging scientists, policymakers, industry, civil soci-
ety groups, patients and the wider public – makes it assumable that this eventually also affects
the role of the brain in our lives and society.
Conclusion
One of the aims of this article was to contribute to insights in how the impact of neuroscience
inﬂuences people’s ideas of self (e.g. Rose and Abi-Rached 2013). I demonstrated that NERRI
people articulated a brain with several characteristics. In their representations, the brain
becomes agentic. In some expressions, it becomes an entity that interacts with the body and/or
self, and in other sentences it takes over human actions or substitutes the self. This shows that
the idea of neuroenhancement clearly emphasises the notion of brain plasticity (we can
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improve our brains), but that this view is regularly combined with more deterministic under-
standings (we are our brains). Moreover, the situation that many of the quotes presented were
expressed by neuroscientists or other neuroenhancement experts demonstrates that this idea of
an agentic brain that can interact with the self and the body, and hence makes people (only)
occasionally responsible and free is not a confusion due to a misunderstanding of science – it
are academics themselves who articulate the brain in this way.
Another characteristic of the brain was the idea of the brain as a system; that can, cannot,
or should not be analysed. This idea of the knowable brain mainly frightens because it is
related to the idea of knowable and controllable people. Again, this is not a sort of na€ıve folk
anxiety for neurologists, but is inferred from explanations of neuroenhancement experts. When
we look at daily neuroimaging practices, however, the knowable brain is by far not in reach
(e.g. Poldrack et al. 2018). That is, the brain as a system breaths the hopes and fears of future
possibilities, but seems to have less in common with its current position in the laboratory. This
is the same with the third characteristic that I recognised in the NERRI quotes: the brain as
the part of ourselves that can make the distinction between natural and artiﬁcial. This idea, that
the brain makes us part of nature and humanity, and hence could also change our humanity is
fascinating, but has nothing to do with daily scientiﬁc practices or results.
What can be concluded is that the brain as an agentic system that has the potential to inﬂu-
ence human nature is a result of intermingled philosophy, metaphorical neuroscience and
imaginative ethics. Although this article does not demonstrate that the brain as an agentic sys-
tem is a reality among the European public, it seems to be a reality among European neuroen-
hancement experts. Moreover, the more this depiction is spread the more real it will become.
What the impact is of a brain that can overrule the self, is potentially controllable, and can
change humanity is speculation, but it will probably not make people more creative and auton-
omous. However, instead of constituting a new piece of imaginative ethics, I hope this article
will contribute to some reﬂection among the researchers working in these neuro-ﬁelds. To
make the debate on neuroenhancement more empirically based and societally relevant, I pro-
pose that we could start with a more empirically based (and societally relevant) explanation of
the brain.
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Notes
1 For more information about the brain in the ﬁeld of neuromarketing, see Brenninkmeijer, J., Schnei-
der, T and Woolgar, S. (Under Review) ‘Witness and silence in neuromarketing: managing the gap
between science and its application’.
2 Unfortunately, the old NERRI website is no longer available but can still be consulted at:
https://web.archive.org/web/20160729102025/http://www.nerri.eu:80/eng/home.aspx (Last accessed
on February 2018).
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3 For example, transcranial Direct Current Stimulation, neurofeedback, Transcranial Magnetic Stimula-
tion, Deep Brain Stimulation.
4 In Rose and Abi-Rached (2013), this argument was nuanced: ‘[this term’neurochemical self’] was
meant to imply, not a wholesale mutation in personhood, but the availability of a neurochemical reg-
ister within which individuals could describe, judge, and seek to modulate their mental states and ail-
ments’. (p. 272)
5 Cie^ncia Viva – Age^ncia Nacional para a Cultura Cientıﬁca e Tecnologica, Portugal; London School
of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom; Radboud University Nijmegen, Netherlands;
Austrian Academy of Sciences, Austria; Scuola Internazionale Superiore di Studi Avanzati, Italy;
Instituto de Biologia Molecular e Celular, Portugal; Experimentarium, Denmark; Tilburg Law School
– Tilburg University, Netherlands; Central European University, Hungary; Universitat Stuttgart, Ger-
many; Johannes Gutenberg Universitat Mainz, Germany; Johannes Kepler Universitat, Austria;
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Spain; Toscana Life Sciences, Italy; University of Iceland, Iceland;
Genetic Alliance UK, United Kingdom; European Brain Council, Belgium; King’s College London,
United Kingdom.
6 See Appendix for an explication of these abbreviations.
7 This was at the end of my analysis. I started with many codes that I divided into the categories: Hav-
ing a brain, interacting with your brain, being your brain; Acting brains; Brain as a black box, brain
as an analysable (controllable) system, brain as a relic; The natural brain, the artiﬁcial brain; NE as
part of humanity/evolution; NE as surpassing humanity/normality; others. This resulted in four
themes: Brain beings, Brain images, The natural brain vs. the artiﬁcial brain, Metaphors. Also, these
were thereupon reclassiﬁed under the themes of the current paper: Brains and Selves; Systems and
Metaphors; Natural and Artiﬁcial brain.
8 In a world cafe people (experts, students, producers) discuss in small groups, in changing formats,
about several issues in neuroenhancement. This is different from a science cafe where the audience
go into discussion with scientists (neuroenhancement experts) in public.
9 See note 14.
10 Pickersgill and colleagues actually make a different argument. They claim that individuals do not
uncritically adopt neuroscientiﬁc knowledge to their self-understanding but that they make their own
bricolage of knowledge. They also claim that it is partly through the sociological gaze itself that neu-
rologic subjectivity is constituted. I use this last argument to argue that neuroenhancement experts
also create new ideas about the brain. This maintains the argument of Pickersgill et al. (2011) that
this does not necessarily mean that this idea of the brain is also uncritically adopted by the general
public.
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Appendix : Explanation of the material
Documents produced by NERRI partners
MLER = Full Reports of NERRI Mutual Learning Exercises, produced by NERRI partners
and collected with an online questionnaire. In February 2018 to be found at: https://web.arc
hive.org/web/20160810054107/http://nerri.eu/eng/mutual-learning-exercises.aspx
NN = NERRI news, written by NERRI partners on the NERRI website. Collected in March
2016 from: http://www.nerri.eu/eng/news-highlights/nerri-news.aspx. In February 2018 to be
found at: https://web.archive.org/web/20160324061457/http://nerri.eu/eng/news-highlights/nerri-
news.aspx
NM = NERRI meeting, May 2014 (notes of the author).
NR = NERRI Reports.
I = Interview Report: NERRI D2.3 National and European perspectives of stakeholders.
Summaries of all interviews from all countries, written by NERI partners
R = Reconnaissance: D2.2 Neuroenhancement and European Normative Anchor Points
B = D2 5_NERRI_Brieﬁng_Paper
Interviews (Neuroenhancement experts, not involved in NERRI)
I = Dutch interviews, (10 interviews conducted by Winnie Toonders, transcribed, originally in
Dutch). In this article are quoted:
1 Researcher of neuro-technologies (student)
2 Neuroscientist (Professor)
3 Researcher of neuroenhancement (student)
4 Cognitive neuroscientist (Professor)
5 Investigator of neuro-technologies (Professor)
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Mutual Learning Exercises (Experts and Public)
MLE1 = Science Cafe Nijmegen (recorded and transcribed, originally in Dutch; 9 pages).
MLE1a = Course material (90 pages; including essays written by students), related to MLE1.
See Toonders et al. (2016) for more information on this course and MLE.
MLE3 = DBS Symposium Tilburg (notes, originally in Dutch, 8 pages).
MLE12 = Neuroenhancement: a true unfolding of man. Partly transcribed in November 2014
from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eioy_sIICiU (7 pages).
MLE38 = World Cafe Enschede EEG (recorded and transcribed, originally in Dutch; 76
pages).
MLE39 = World Cafe Enschede tDCS (recorded and transcribed, originally in Dutch; 57
pages).
Summary of the material
Code Description Produced by: Pages
MLER Full Reports of NERRI Mutual
Learning Exercises
NERRI partners 235
NN NERRI news NERRI Partners 143
NM NERRI Meeting, notes NERRI Partners 13
NR (I/R/B) NERRI Reports: Interview
Summaries (I) Reconnaissance
(R) and Brieﬁng paper (B)
NERRI Partners 207
I (quotes from
1 to 5 are used)







Experts and public 247
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